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Abstract— This paper aims to explore the supply chain 
resilience capabilities of firms, focusing on their ability to respond 
to the COVID-19 pandemic disruption. Based on two cases each in 
the pharmaceutical and mineral water industries, this paper 
identifies various strategies managers mobilized to tackle supply 
chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. This research 
contributes to theory through a proposed double-helix framework 
showing the dimension of disruptions and the capabilities concept 
to mitigate COVID-19. In addition, an in-depth investigation of the 
perceived importance versus actual supply chain resilience 
capabilities deployed is discussed and validated with practitioners. 
The findings of this study also address a critical gap in the supply 
chain operations management literature and provide a practical 
approach for managers to better manage future pandemic 
disruptions. 
 
Index Terms— Capability, case study, COVID-19, 
digitalization, disruption, resilience, supply chain. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE COVID-19 pandemic has forced firms to transform 
their business models and supply chains (SCs), but 
research and guidance for managers on how to develop 
resilience capabilities to address the disruptions from the 
pandemic is limited. The SC disruptions caused by the COVID-
19 pandemic have had significant global-scale impacts and 
have changed the marketplace, industries and firms of all sizes. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has unintentionally created new 
‘norms’ and business environments in the marketplace, 
requiring firms to adjust accordingly if they are to survive. For 
instance, new guidelines for food production have been outlined 
by the FAO and WHO (e.g., FAO and WHO, 2020) concerning 
curbing the pandemic within and beyond the factory walls. 
Although digital technologies are viewed as a quick panacea for 
the firm in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic [2]–[4], the 
deployment of digital technologies also depends upon another 
set of firm capabilities [5]. The misalignment between firm 
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capabilities and digital technologies may provide a rather short-
term solution, and the synergetic value between the existing 
capabilities residing within a firm cannot be achieved and 
sustained. Moreover, jumping into digital technologies is not 
within every firm’s capacity [5] and hence complicates the firm 
capabilities regarding creating resilience, especially in the 
supply chain. Therefore, it is important to investigate the 
residing supply chain capabilities that can be utilized by firms 
when faced with a disruption. 
 SC resilience (SCRes) is critical for firms to survive 
disruptions [6]–[9]. Ali, Mahfouz and Arisha [6] pointed out 
that firms need to have a strategic set of SCRes capabilities to 
quickly absorb, adjust, and normalize the disruption to form a 
new business model. In contrast, firms that are unable to deploy 
the correct SCRes strategy will end up in worse states and will 
have more difficulty revitalizing their businesses. Ambulkar, 
Blackhurst and Grawe [7] argued that firms must carefully align 
their resilience strategies with firm capabilities; hence, firms 
should promote the most likely, effective, and economical 
decisions. Due to the novelty of COVID-19 and its impact on 
the business environment, the previous literature on SCRes can 
provide beneficial tools, but when adopting these suggestions, 
firms should closely consider which of these suggestions are 
appropriate for their particular situation, as the previous 
research on SCRes is commonly based on conceptual or 
simulated disruptions that may not be applicable in all settings 
[8], [9]. 
SCRes is commonly associated with the following four 
phases of strategy deployment for overcoming disruptions: 
readiness, response, recovery, and adaptation [9], [10]. In 
general, the quicker the firm adapts to the disruption, the faster 
it will return to its normal state or even to a better condition; in 
contrast, the firm will continue to suffer from uncertainty [11]. 
Resilience is the ability of a firm to be alert to, adapt to, and 
quickly respond to the changes brought by SC disruptions [7], 
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[12]. Ali et al. [13] argued that firms must adopt SCRes 
strategies while considering their firm resources/capabilities. In 
the context of SCRes, the three main components of SC 
capabilities are proactive capability, design quality, and 
reactive capability [14]. Brusset and Teller [15]  discussed three 
firm resilience capabilities from the context of external 
practices, internal processes, and integration. In Kochan and 
Nowicki [16], resilience capabilities were grouped according to 
the phases of readiness, response, and recovery. Despite the 
increasing popularity of SCRes studies, there is a lack of 
consensus on a well-grounded definition of SCRes [11], [16], 
[17]. In addition, the lack of clarity about the relationships 
between SCRes and capability constructs may be a result of 
divergent concepts of theory building [18], [19]. 
Many studies have reviewed the SCRes literature [17], [19], 
[20] and have found that generalizability has not been achieved 
and that a lack of clarity persists regarding SCRes [16]. One of 
the most likely and logical reasons is the diversity of potential 
disruptions and the capabilities of the specific cases studied [8], 
[9]. There is still a lack of theoretical understanding of the 
connotations of both SC capabilities and resilience [14], [20]. 
Hence, this paper aims to propose a new model for SCRes 
capability in the COVID-19 context, aiming to fill some gaps 
that exist in the mainstream SCRes literature. Moreover, 
different resilience strategies may be adopted by firms 
depending on the SC context, the disruption and the new 
environment [8], [9]. Following this argument, this paper also 
aims to explore in-depth the SCRes capabilities that have been 
deployed in responding to COVID-19. In summary, the 
following research questions are developed for this research 
investigation: 
RQ1: What types of disruptions arise from the COVID-19 
pandemic upstream and downstream of the SC? How do these 
vary from one industry/firm to another? 
RQ2: Which SCRes capabilities are conceptually relevant to 
COVID-19? How can the capabilities be matched with COVID-
19 disruptions? 
RQ3: Which SCRes concept is the best solution to COVID-
19? Should all the SCRes capability concepts of perceived 
importance be equally distributed? Is the SCRes capability 
strategy based on the concept that is perceived important 
actually being deployed? 
RQ4: Which capabilities are regarded as feasible for firm 
deployment? What is the priority for SCRes capabilities? 
Through four case studies (two in the pharmaceutical 
industry and two in the drinking water industry) drawn from 
manufacturing firms in Indonesia, this research aims to 
characterize the COVID-19 disruption as an archetype. This 
archetype is matched with firm SC capabilities in terms of the 
firm’s proactive and reactive resilience strategy. This research 
also discusses the firm’s perceived and actual SCRes strategy 
for mitigating COVID-19 disruptions. Based on this research, a 
conceptual framework is proposed. This study makes relevant 
improvements to the existing gap by discussing the capabilities 
on both the supply and demand sides of the SC. Using COVID-
19 as the research context, more specific measures of the 
disruption and the associated capabilities are established. The 
modern SC is globalized, interconnected, complex and long, 
which intensifies the need to understand the nature of COVID-
19 disruptions and how firms can best match their strategy and 
capabilities to the present problematic market conditions. 
This research is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
literature on COVID-19 and its impact on the SC and argues 
that SCRes can be a useful tool for mitigation. Section 3 
describes the methodological phases of the case studies in this 
research. Section 4 proposes SCRes in the COVID-19 
framework as a theoretical contribution. Section 5 validates the 
framework and prioritizes using the MADM technique. Section 
6 concludes with the findings and suggests future research 
directions. 
II. GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPT PREPARATION 
A. COVID-19 and The Global SC 
In the first few weeks of COVID-19 in late 2019, the global 
community saw it as a local epidemic, as had been the case with 
outbreaks of Ebola and the normal flu. However, as the number 
of COVID-19 cases continued to grow and became 
uncontrollable, it became apparent that the outbreak would be 
far more difficult to contain because most parts of the world are 
so well connected. As a result, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic on the 11th 
of March 2020 [21]. With guidance provided by the WHO, 
governments have been taking measures to combat COVID-19, 
notably social distancing, self-isolation, quarantine, travel 
restrictions and lockdowns [22]. Efforts to mitigate the 
transmission of COVID-19 have impacted not only social life 
but also the economy. Moreover, the pandemic has shaped the 
way business is being carried out [23], [24]. For example, the 
WHO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
have produced new operational guidance to be followed by the 
food industry to address disruptions [1], and other industries are 
expected to be impacted by the same trends. The new norms of 
doing business have profoundly affected firms’ capacities and 
capabilities. 
The prevention of global spread meant that the disruption 
was heavier in either the upstream or the downstream part of 
the SC, rather than both at the same time. In contrast, the 
unprecedented global disruption caused by COVID-19 has 
affected every section of the SC. On the one hand, in the 
downstream sectors of some SCs, there has been a hike in 
product demand [25],  which may be due to panic buying and 
the hoarding of products considered essential, such as 
pharmaceuticals and face masks [22], [26]. On the other hand, 
there have been sharp decreases in demand in other sectors. 
These new purchasing behaviours have created an imbalance 
between supply and demand. As a consequence of the sudden 
hike in demand and last-mile delivery problems leading to 
product unavailability, actors upstream in the SC have found it 
challenging to meet demand. Furthermore, government 
closures of large numbers and multiple varieties of businesses 




B. COVID-19 Demands on SCRes Capabilities 
The COVID-19 pandemic has created a new landscape for 
the marketplace and has led firms to change their SC norms. 
Under normal conditions, firms governed their SCs by 
responding to market demand to maximize profit. In general, 
COVID-19 has disrupted both ends of the SC. Thus, firm and 
SC resilience during the COVID-19 disruption is crucial for 
firms’ survival and sustainability. As highlighted by Sá et al.  
[8], in the context of SC resilience, a firm that can quickly 
respond to a disruption has a higher chance of surviving and 
remaining competitive. However, there is very little guidance 
in the literature on the best practices for firms in situations such 
as the present one, and the literature on the role of SCRes in 
mitigating disruptions has lacked the backing of empirical 
evidence [8], [9]. Nevertheless, firms can embrace changes in 
the marketplace by adjusting their internal and external 
strategies to address the new COVID-19 environmental 
conditions. The ability of a firm to be resilient and adjust to 
environmental changes lies deep within its SC [20], [27]. 
Moreover, the firm’s ability to ensure the resilience of its SC 
may be greater if it can draw lessons from previous cases. 
However, generalizing the findings reported in the literature can 
be difficult, especially given that resilience profiles are highly 
dependent upon the resources and capabilities of the focal firm 
[18], [28]. 
Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton [29] developed an SCRes 
framework that was constructed with SC vulnerability and SC 
capability dimensions. They believed that a relationship exists 
between each SC vulnerability and the SC capability employed 
to address that vulnerability. The different types of SC 
vulnerability will require different sets of SC capabilities to be 
employed [8]. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton [30] argued that 
empowerment, collaboration with government and personal 
security are a set of SC capabilities that can be used to combat 
vulnerability to a pandemic. These studies discussed how the 
different sets of SCRes capabilities are evolving and find that 
they are highly dependent upon the distraction and that the 
models need to be improved. The SCRes dimensions of SC 
readiness, SC response, and SC recovery are commonly 
discussed in the literature [10], [19], [20], [27]. Chowdhury and 
Quaddus [14] constructed an SCRes framework with the 
following three primary dimensions: proactive capability, 
reactive capability, and SC design quality. The proactive and 
reactive dimensions were more often selected by companies to 
increase their readiness, response, and recovery ability levels 
during both the pre-disaster and post-disaster phases. Based on 
a literature review and qualitative study, the variables for each 
type of SC capability were determined. Despite the 
comprehensiveness of the previous literature, the majority of 
these studies were conducted based on a conceptual 
understanding of a disruption, and the model and argument of 
SCRes are broad and may not be relevant to real disruptions, 
such as COVID-19. 
Hosseini et al. [31] developed three categories of SC 
capability in SCRes to tackle SC disruptions. They argued that 
SC capability is an important dimension of the SCRes 
framework under conditions of uncertainty. In their SCRes 
framework, the three categories of SC capability, as three lines 
of defence (absorptive, adaptive, and restorative), were used to 
increase the firm’s ability to handle SC disruptions. The first 
and second lines of SCRes were absorptive and adaptive 
capabilities, while the third line of SCRes was restorative 
capability. Based on their quantitative analysis, they determined 
the drivers of each SC capability, but they focused only on the 
upstream part of the SC and neglected the importance of the 
downstream, which is an equally important aspect for both SC 
and resilience studies. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this research, a three-phase methodology similar to that 
applied by Ali, Tan and Ismail [32] and Tse and Tan [33] was 
adopted to elicit SCRes capabilities. The first phase aimed to 
identify SCRes strategies and capabilities to guide the authors in 
the elicitation of related information during the next two phases. 
First, the previous studies on SCRes strategies and capabilities 
were reviewed to gain a better understanding of the definitions and 
their applicability during the COVID-19 disruption [14], [16], 
[34], [35]. In the second phase, the literature review was 
triangulated with the results of interviews with top managers from 
the firms in the four case studies. The objective of this phase was 
to contextualize the SCRes strategy and capabilities theory from 
the perspective of the two selected industries in the setting of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The data obtained from the case studies 
were used to explain the related literature. During this phase, the 
data were analysed, and the capabilities were explained to provide 
further extensions of the new knowledge regarding unprecedented 
disruptions, with the potential for practical application by 
managers. The results are explained and discussed in Section 4. In 
the third phase, the findings were verified and are presented in 
Section 5. This phase extended the previous research to investigate 
the actual practices implemented by the case firms studied in 
response to the COVID-19 disruption. Furthermore, in this phase, 
the proposed framework was verified through follow-up 
interviews assisted by questionnaires and multicriteria decision 
making (MCDM) analysis, exploring the gap between the 
perceived importance of strategies and firm capabilities and their 
prioritization. All interviews were conducted online between the 
fourth week of March and the third week of April 2020. 
 
A. Case Study Profiles 
This study selects two industries in the Indonesian setting, i.e., 
drinking water and pharmaceuticals, for the following compelling 
reasons. First, both were considered essential industries in 
Indonesia, with constant demand, before the COVID-19 
disruption. Second, with the arrival of the pandemic, demand 
proved to be unexpectedly volatile, with a decrease in the market 
for drinking water and an increase in that for pharmaceuticals. 
Third, to avoid the bias of having a single firm represent the 




SUMMARY OF THE FOUR CASE STUDY COMPANIES 
 
Profile Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Indonesian market share 5–6% 55% 35% 20% 
Number of products: stock 
keeping units (SKUs) 
36 SKUs 
4 product families, 28 
SKUs 
150 SKUs 120 SKUs 
Sales revenue 1.9 million (IDR) 15 billion (IDR) 1.2 billion (IDR) 1.4 billion (IDR) 
Number of employees 734 12,500 800 600 
Plants, distribution centres 
(DCs), and branches/depots 
22 plants and 96 
depots 
23 plants, 15 DCs, and 12 
main distributors 
1 plant and 25 
branches 
3 plants, 
27 branches, and 1 DC 
Interview length 2 hours 2.5 hours 2 hours 1.5 hours 
 
understanding of the phenomenon, this study selected two firms for 
each of the two industries as depicted in Table 1.  
Case 1 in this research is a national company in the drinking 
water industry located in East Java. The company’s products 
included water in 250 ml cups, 330-, 550-, and 1,200-ml bottles, 
and 6- and 19-litre flagons, which were chiefly distributed to 
several cities in Indonesia. Several factories produce drinking 
water products from raw materials (water and plastics for 
packaging), and distribution centre facilities send finished products 
to distributors and stores. Its share of the national market is 
approximately 5–6%, whereas the market leader has a share of 50–
60%. The interviewee was an SC manager with 10 years of 
experience. Case 2 is a multi-national company whose core 
business is drinking water, and its products include water in 240 ml 
plastic cups, 380 ml glass bottles, 330, 600, 750, and 15,000 ml 
plastic bottles, and 19-litre flagons. The company is a market 
leader in Indonesia, providing 50–60% of the country’s drinking 
water. The interviewee had experience as an SC collaboration 
executive and primary deployment manager for 7 years. 
Case 3 is a global pharmaceutical company that distributes its 
products to approximately 41,000 outlets in Indonesia. It provides 
consumer health products (e.g., vitamins and antioxidants) as well 
as prescription drugs. The company has seven brands, some of 
which are among the fastest growing and one of which (for 
multivitamins) is the most valuable brand for such products in 
Indonesia. The interviewee, a national sales director, was 
responsible for the sales organization, sales operation business 
processes, coordination with production and other departments, 
and other areas. He had nine years of experience in sales and 
operations. Case 4 is also a global pharmaceutical company 
manufacturing consumer health products and prescription drugs. 
The former product group includes several brands of 
multivitamins, cough medicine, constipation drugs, and others. 
The company has three plants, which are located in Vietnam, 
Bandung, and Bogor, for producing customer health products. 
Approximately 40% of its prescription drugs are produced in its 
factory in Jakarta, and the rest are imported. 
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING SCRES UNDER COVID-19 
DISRUPTIONS 
COVID-19 has significantly impacted industries globally, but 
the disruptions are not homogenous. Therefore, the 
generalization and application of SCRes knowledge can be 
difficult and perplexing. Moreover, the unprecedented nature of 
the COVID-19 disruptions means that governments have little 
understanding of the best policy or guidance for firms to follow. 
For example, the Indonesian government introduced a social 
distancing policy on March 17, 2020, which led to the 
cancellation of mass gatherings such as wedding parties, 
religious activities, conferences, formal meetings, and others. 
This greatly reduced the demand for bottled drinking water. In 
contrast, the distancing policy did not have a similar impact on 
healthcare products, such as multivitamins, herbal medicines, 
masks, hand sanitizers and so on. In managing an SC 
efficiently, environmental effects and consumer demand play a 
large role for the firm in setting its strategies and capabilities. 
Our case study companies experienced the opposite effects on 
demand, which provides a unique setting for investigation and 
for extending the SCRes literature to examine the effects of a 
disruption on companies with similar sets of capabilities. 
According to Pettit, Croxton and Fiksel [30], there are three 
key types of SC disruption: supply, production, and demand 
disruptions. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
examples of supply-side disruptions include a lack of raw 
materials, price fluctuations, transportation problems and 
currency fluctuations. Production disruptions include 
fluctuations in the numbers of workers and machines, 
difficulties with outsourcing, low productivity, and the need for 
physical distancing in the workplace. Demand-side disruptions 
include demand volatility, distribution and inventory problems 
and large numbers of people working from home. 
 
A. SC Disruptions during the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Detailed notes were prepared during the online interviews, 
which were recorded. An interview protocol that was developed 
based on the triangulation of previous literature, e.g., [14], [31], 
[36]–[38], was used as a guideline to ensure that the 
interviewees elaborated on the disruptions to each end of the SC 
(see Appendix A). Additional material was collected on each 
company’s market share, brands, product items, number of 
plants and distribution centres from the companies’ websites 
and annual reports, as well as from newspapers and elsewhere 
[39]. The data comparison analysis started with transcribing the 
voice recording of each interview. An iterative process was 
used to identify key variables on each end of the SC, as Pagell 
and Krause (2005) highlighted that an iterative approach with 




SUMMARY OF THE CROSS-CASE COMPARISON ANALYSIS 
 
SC Disruptions 
Drinking-Water Industry Pharmaceutical Industry 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
1. Supply-side     
- Availability of raw 
materials 
Supply decrease (-3) Supply normal (0) Supply normal (0) Supply normal (0) 
- Availability of spare 
parts 
Spare part shortage (-2) Supply normal (0) Supply normal (0) Supply normal (0) 
- Fluctuation of raw 
material prices 
Slight increase (1) Slight increase (1) Slight increase (1) Slight increase (1) 
- Transportation Delay (-2) Normal (0) Normal (0) Normal (0) 
2. Production-side     
- Production fluctuations Decrease (cups & 
bottles) (-2) 




Slight increase (3) 
- Fluctuations in 
production hours and 
workers 
Slight decrease in 
hours of production 
and several workers 
moving to flagon 
production (-1) 
Stable in hours of 
production and several 
workers moving to 
flagon production (0) 
Increase in hours 
and shifts of 
production and 
number of workers 
(4) 
Increase in hours 
of production and 
slight increase in 
number of workers 
(3) 
- Employee productivity Decrease (-1) Decrease (-1) Normal (0) Normal (0) 










3. Demand-side     
- Volatility of demand Large decrease in 
demand (-3) 
Large decrease in 
demand (-3) 
Dramatic increase in 
demand [5] 
Significant 
increase in demand 
(4) 
- Prices of finished 
products 
No change (0) No change (0) No change (0) No change (0) 
- Stock of finished 
products in the 
warehouse 




- Number of delivery 
trips (distribution) 
Moderate decrease (-2) Moderate decrease (-2) Large increase (4) Large increase (4) 
- Productivity of sales 










- COVID-19 protocol in 
sales and distribution 
















Work from home 





Note: Score for degree of impact: 0= none, 1= slight, 2= moderate, 3= significant 4 = substantial, and 5= radical. A positive sign indicates an 
increasing impact, while a negative sign represents a decreasing impact. 
 
analysis. A cross-case comparison analysis was then conducted 
to detect commonalities and differences in the patterns of SC 
disruption [39], [41]. A summary of the cross-case comparison 
regarding the SC disruption among the cases studied is 
presented in Table 2. In addition, COVID-19 caused both 
negative and positive disruptions to the operations of the case 
study firms. This, however, demonstrates that COVID-19 has 
impacted the SC in different ways and, therefore, different and 
unique SCRes interventions are required. 
 
1.) Supply-side Disruptions 
During the pandemic, the availability of raw materials and 
spare parts was disrupted when raw materials came from a 
country seriously affected by COVID-19. This is especially true 
for companies that had implemented single sourcing. In case 1, 
plastics (for bottles) and spare parts for maintenance were in 
decreasing supply, as the chief suppliers of both were in China, 
a country seriously affected by COVID-19. Shipments from 
China were also delayed due to rules on the delivery of goods 
introduced by the Chinese authorities. Companies that used a 
multi-sourcing strategy, centralized purchasing, and a buffer 
strategy were better able to address the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic. The use of third-party logistics (3PL) services for 
transportation also reduced shipping delays. In case 2, which is 
a multi-national company, and in cases 3 and 4, which are 
global companies, multi-sourcing strategies, centralized 
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purchasing, and 3PL company services to handle transportation 
were all in place. In cases 3 and 4, although almost all the raw 
materials were imported from European countries, their normal 
supply was maintained. The delay in supply transportation from 
overseas was moderate (1–2 weeks) and could be managed 
through the use of buffer stock. 
 
2.) Production-side Disruptions 
On the production side, the drinking water and 
pharmaceutical industries saw opposite effects. In the drinking 
water industry (cases 1 and 2), production declined, especially 
for the primary finished products (e.g., 220 ml cups and 600 ml 
bottles). However, in the pharmaceutical industry (cases 3 and 
4), production increased significantly. In cases 1 and 2, the 
companies slightly decreased their hours of production and 
maintained the number of workers by moving some employees 
to jobs focusing on other products (the flagons). In contrast, in 
cases 3 and 4, the companies had to increase their production 
significantly. For example, in case 3, the company increased the 
number of shifts each day from two to three to fulfil the 
dramatic increase in demand. The number of workers operating 
manually operated machines, such as packers also increased. In 
case 4, under normal conditions, three shifts were in operation 
only on certain days, but during the pandemic, three shifts were 
operated every day. There were additions to the daily 
workforce, mostly in the form of outsourced workers in the 
packing department. All four companies strictly implemented 
COVID-19 protocols, with body temperature checks, hand 
washing, physical distancing, mask wearing, and other 
measures. In the drinking water cases, employee productivity 
slightly decreased due to these protocols, but in the 
pharmaceutical industry, the productivity of workers remained 
at its normal levels because workers were already well 
accustomed to wearing masks, washing hands and so on. 
 
3.) Demand-side Disruptions 
The consumption of multivitamins increased greatly during 
the pandemic to fight infection. The demand for multivitamins 
for adults increased by approximately 500% in case 3 and 
approximately 300% in case 4. The opposite was true in the case 
of drinking water, where the demand for cup and bottle 
products, in particular, decreased sharply. While the stocks of 
finished multivitamin products decreased significantly, the 
stock of drinking water held by the companies increased 
significantly. The number of delivery trips to customers for 
pharmaceutical products increased significantly, while the 
number of delivery trips for drinking water decreased 
moderately. In sales and distribution, COVID-19 protocols 
were implemented by all four companies, such as a work-from-
home policy for the main sales office; additionally, the 
companies’ drivers had to follow not only the companies’ 
protocols but also the government rules and those of their 
distributors. All four companies reported a slight decrease in 
overall productivity. 
B. Proposed SCRes Capability Framework for COVID-19 
Disruptions 
Through a thorough literature review and iterative interviews 
with subjects for two cases in the Indonesian drinking water and 
pharmaceutical industries, this research proposes an SCRes 
framework for tackling the disruption caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic based on [30], [31]. Pettit et al. [29] proposed the 
concept of disruptions as the influencer of SC changes, where 
capabilities are viewed as continuous interactions in the SC, as 
derived from systems theory, where SCs are viewed as open 
systems [42].  This framework is supported by Hosseini et al. 
(2019), who note that disruption factors influence the resilience 
capacity, where the latter is the ability to reduce the impacts 
from disruptions, minimize their consequences and recover the 
previous level of performance. The variables relating to SC 
capabilities are categorized along proactive and reactive 
dimensions in the present study, as suggested by the literature 
review. Their relevance to the resilience of SCs during the 
COVID-19 outbreak was verified. The proposed framework, as 
shown in Figure 1, incorporates SC disruptions and SC 
capabilities. The disruptions are categorized as supply side, 
production side, and demand side; these categories were 
derived from the interviews. The SC capabilities in the 
proposed framework consist of four dimensions: flexibility, SC 
readiness, SC integration, and SC response and recovery. The 
variables used to reflect SCRes capabilities were obtained from 
the systematic review of the literature and were confirmed in 
the interviews. It is important to note that the proposed 
framework focuses on the proactive SC capabilities used to 
address the SC disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 
1.) Capability of the Firm to Respond and Recover 
The interviews showed that two of the seven variables in the 
response and recovery dimension identified in the literature 
were especially important. These were quick responses and 
communications with the government. The ability of the firm 
and the SC to respond and recover during disruption is crucial, 
especially for achieving an equilibrium between supply and 
demand [14], and this ability is essential for developing SCRes 
[9], [43]. The capability to quickly respond to a crisis and 
disruption is an important determinant of SCRes [44], [45]. 
Recovery from a SC disruption is a unique ability in companies 
and their SC [14], and a quick recovery from a disruption can 
reduce the disruption’s impact [10] and facilitate a return to the 
company’s original position or to a better state [11]. According 
to the literature, the variables related to SC response and 
recovery include quick response, the establishment of a 
response team, quick recovery, loss absorption, reduction of 
impact, and recovery costs. A company that responds quickly 
to a SC disruption can solidify its leadership position [44]. A 
response team in a company and in the SC is needed to mobilize 
resources [30]. The findings from the interviews revealed two 
variables in the response and recovery dimensions. All the case 
companies created formal response teams to handle the 
COVID-19 pandemic (RR1). 
[…] We formed a formal team that specifically handled 
COVID-19 in our company and made COVID-19 protocols, 
procedures, and policies. [...] Workers and guests who enter the 
production area must be checked for body temperature with a 





Fig. 1. The proposed SCRes framework for firms during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
In the face of unprecedented COVID-19 disruptions and their 
global impacts, communicating and cooperating with the 
government were crucial abilities for firms to possess (RR2). 
The use of digital technologies should be deployed to allow 
timely and relevant communication with actors along with the 
SC. An important note that needs to be taken regarding this 
ability is that although not all firms are endowed with the latest 
technologies, the social media platform can be optimally 
utilized. To ensure their survival and competitiveness, firms 
were required to follow the rules and policies introduced by the 
government, such as restrictions on social gatherings, but a 
creative and supportive approach is nevertheless required that 
is suited to the firm’s resources. Moreover, during the COVID-
19 disruptions, the behaviours of people, communities, and 
employees differed from their normal behaviours. In the 
interviews, it was noted that social distancing was one of the 
most prevalent COVID-19 mitigation measures, thus forcing 
work-from-home policies for certain departments within the 
firms. For the production sectors, however, working from home 
was not viable, as these workers need to be physically present; 
instead, they had to observe protocols on physical distancing 
and frequent handwashing, for example. In responding to the 
uncertain demand caused by COVID-19, close contact with the 
government was deemed necessary, especially concerning SC 
distribution activities. In this light, the interviewees indicated 
that two of the variables in the SC response and recovery 
dimensions were especially significant. For example: 
[…] in the head office, including the sales and distribution 
department, work from home (WFH) policies are applied in my 
company. […] In the production area, in addition to 
implementing COVID-19 pandemic protocols, such as physical 
distancing between employees, encouraging all workers to 
frequently wash their hands and others [...], we also monitor 
and coordinate with the government for our production and 
distribution activities. (Case 3). 
 
2.) Capability of the Firm to Ensure SC Readiness 
The literature on SCRes shows that SC readiness is another 
critical dimension for dealing with disruptions [14], [46]. SC 
readiness is defined as an upfront capability to reduce the 
occurrence and impact of SC disruptions [14]. A firm needs an 
SC capability to reduce its susceptibility to disruption [30], 
[35], [46]. The results indicated six practices used to address the 
COVID-19 pandemic. First, as argued by Pettit, Croxton and 
Fiksel [30], SC readiness can be achieved through training 
(RD1). This result corresponds to a firm capability that is driven 
through human resources and eventually leads to SCRes [13]. 
Second and third, the anticipation of currency fluctuations and 
cash flow (RD2) [29] and demand forecasts (RD3) [44], [47] 
suggest that the ability of firms to look into the future was 
important in dealing with the pandemic. This, however, was 
being done on a more short-term basis, even day to day, because 
of the high degree of uncertainty surrounding COVID-19. The 
usage of the latest technologies, such as big data analytics, can 
be one of the capabilities that will enable readiness capabilities. 
For example, Tan et al. [48] argue that big data can be harvested 




Fourth, appropriate inventory management (RD4) that suits 
the conditions is needed [30], [49]. Due to the impact of 
COVID-19, in particular, due to the effects on suppliers in 
China, the issue of inventory was very challenging. The 
respondents highlighted the great value of the ability to source 
from alternative suppliers. Fifth, alternative transportation 
options can also increase firm readiness (RD5) [9], [14]. The 
respondents noted that during the COVID-19 disruptions, they 
made more use of third-party logistics. This was due to 
movement restrictions; moreover, the rules and regulations on 
transport seemed to change daily. Sixth, personal security, 
along with protocols to counter the pandemic (RD6) [50], was 
another variable in the readiness dimension. The interviewees 
said their firms were adhering to the preventive measures by not 
allowing any personnel with symptoms to access the premises. 
The readiness of the firms to address personal security was 
given high priority, as observed in the additional standard 
operating procedures implemented in the daily routines of the 
firms. 
[…] Due to the increasingly worrisome condition of COVID-
19 in Indonesia, our company conducts work from home at the 
head office. […] In the production and distribution area, all our 
employees and guests may not enter the production and 
distribution area if they have a body temperature higher than 
37 degrees. […] our main raw materials except water are 
plastics and resins, which are imported. The increase in the 
value of the dollar is quite high (10–15%), affecting the cost of 
raw materials. The amount of plastics and resins needed can 
still be fulfilled. Until now (25 March 2020), nothing has been 
significant because we have enough buffer stock. [….] Indeed, 
most vendors of raw plastics in China were affected by COVID-
19, but the purchasing team section was able to make purchases 
from providers that were not affected by COVID-19 and 
assisted with 3PL delivery for transportation to our country 
[…] An increase in the value of the dollar can be anticipated 
on a daily basis by the team in the relevant department which 
is focused on managing this. (Case 2) […] 
 
3.) Capability to Reap SC Integration Benefits 
Brusset and Teller [15] defined SC integration as “the degree 
to which a manufacturer strategically collaborates with their SC 
partners and intra- and inter-organization”. The objective of SC 
integration is efficiency and effectiveness in the flows of 
products and services, information, money, and decisions to 
provide high-quality customer service at low cost and high 
speed [51]–[53]. The capability of the firm to regulate its SC 
integration enables it to adjust to disruptions; that is, this 
capability increases the SCRes [15], [54]. The SCRes literature 
noted that the SC integration capabilities during the disruption 
included the ability to coordinate responses between plants and 
departments within the firm [30], the sharing of valuable and 
strategic information (IN1) within and beyond the factory walls 
[31], [55], [56], and transformation to a new collaborative 
landscape with SC partners [30], [47]. 
Internal integration refers to inter-functional and 
interdepartmental integration to coordinate in response to 
market changes and disruptions [57]. In the interviews, internal 
integration between plants and departments (IN2) was found to 
be an important practice in ensuring the firm’s effectiveness in 
combating the disruptions from COVID-19. For a large country 
such as Indonesia, some departments are separated by great 
geographical distances, so the cohesiveness of the practices and 
strategies of plants and departments can be achieved only via 
internal integration that is driven by digital technologies. 
However, the interviews indicated that during the disruption, 
information sharing and exchange were equally important 
between all SC partners in response to the pandemic, which 
may extend beyond the digital network of the firm. More 
extensive information exchange through digital technologies 
with all actors in the SC (IN3) enables risk analyses for better 
decision making during, before and after disruptions [50]. In 
short, the ability to increase and develop existing and new 
collaborative effort with SC partners (IN4) during uncertainties 
is seen to be an output of SC integration during the disruption. 
Firms should focus on preventing further negative impacts from 
the disruption and on reducing the probability of SC disruptions 
recurring upstream in the SC [47], especially when all SC-
related information has been carefully stored and analysed. 
 
4.) Capability to be Flexible 
Flexibility is a significant dimension of SCRes defining the 
ability of companies to respond to changes in the external 
market and within the SC [58]. Moreover, flexibility can be 
viewed as the ability to access alternative options in the SC to 
obtain the desired output [20]. The case study indicated six 
flexibility practices that were applied to combat COVID-19 
disruptions. In agreement with the literature, the flexibility 
capability variables that enhance SC resilience mentioned by 
the respondents were having flexible production [14], [31], 
[58], a multi-skilled workforce [18], [59], multi-purpose 
machines [11], contract flexibility [10], [30], flexibility in 
sourcing [60], and flexibility in distribution [46]. Of these 
variables, the capability to be flexible in production (F1), 
having a multi-skilled workforce (F2), and having multi-
purpose machines are arguably under the control of the firm 
(F3), in that no external parties are directly involved. 
[…] During COVID-19 time, we do whatever we can to 
survive. We identify and focus on our internal resources 
because everyone is impacted. Whatever we have (internally), 
we utilize…we need to adjust our resources; we need to change 
it because it is easier…yes, now (COVID-19) is challenging 
time, we need to take care of each other. It is important to make 
our resources ready and flexible enough…[…] (Case 1) 
[…] Since our country has been affected by COVID-19, we 
are facing problems increasing production, and we are unable 
to fully speed up receipt of our main raw materials and the 
distribution of our products to customers. We realized that our 
flexibility level is not good enough to respond to the 
dramatically increasing demand for our customer health 
products, such as multivitamins and others. […] (Case 3) 
On the other hand, having flexibility regarding contracts (F4), 
sourcing (F5) and distribution (F6) is deemed to be more 
challenging for firms to achieve, as these involve external 
parties. The competition currently tends to be between SCs 
rather than between firms, and the capability of SC actors to 
work as a unit provides competitive advantages. However, the 
impact of a disruption forces firms to react differently, even 
within a single SC [8], [9]. Furthermore, the strategy and 
approach of each firm in embracing the disruption may be 
restricted by firm-specific limitations and resources. In light of 
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this, the ability of a firm to dictate or even influence its SC 
partners, such as through revising a written contract to suit the 
business environment during and after a disruption, may affect 
the firm’s short- and long-term resilience planning. In addition, 
having the flexibility to find alternative sourcing enables the 
firm to ensure supply and production. The case study results 
indicated firms’ dependence on importing raw materials from 
China, and these imports were heavily impacted by the 
disruption. This underlines the importance of having the 
capability to access alternative sourcing. Similarly, during a 
distribution, a plant’s inability to increase output to meet 
demand from consumers makes a firm likely to lose sales to 
competitors. A higher technology interface provides higher 
flexibility in the SC. In particular, with the involvement of the 
SC actors that are also impacted by COVID-19, real-time data 
are more valuable relative to the previous data. Digitally 
interconnected SCs are better informed during a time of 
uncertainty and, hence enhance the capability to be flexible 
[61]. 
V. PRACTICAL GUIDANCE ON SCRES CAPABILITIES DURING 
COVID-19 DISRUPTIONS 
The second phase of the research was conducted in three 
stages to obtain practical guidance regarding the capabilities 
utilized during the COVID-19 disruptions, such as determining 
the feasible variables for SCR capabilities on the SC side, 
perceived importance and actual capabilities, and prioritizing 
the dimensions and variables of SCRes capabilities. 
 
A. Determining the Feasible Variables of SCRes Capabilities 
on the SC Side 
The first stage aims to determine the feasible variables for 
SCRes capabilities in the SC (supply, production, and demand 
side). A vast amount of information on SC capabilities was 
available, and both broad agreement and controversial feedback 
were recorded. As depicted in Table 3, the informants expressed 
their opinions connecting the nexus between the SCRes 
capabilities and SC stages. The informants provided their 
opinions regarding the perceived importance of each variable 
(0 = not sure, 1 = to some extent, and 3 = important). In the 
results, the cells containing SCRes capability variables that do 
not impact stages of the SC are marked with grey; for example, 
flexibility in production and multi-skilled workforce effects are 
only found to impact the production stage. Meanwhile, 
readiness to manage inventory impacts both the supply and 
demand sides, and personal security with the COVID-19 
pandemic protocol has an impact on all three sections of the SC. 
In total, there were six variables for SCRes capabilities that 
were not selected for inclusion in the next phase because they 
were believed to be insufficiently relevant and lacked a 
significant effect, namely, COVID-19 disruption detection, 
quick response to the COVID-19 pandemic, quick recovery, 
loss absorption, impact reduction, and recovery costs. 
 
B. Perceived Importance and Actual Implementation of SCRes 
Capabilities in Mitigating the Business Disruptions Caused by 
COVID-19 
In the second stage, the perceived importance and actual 
implementation of SCRes were investigated to gain a better 
understanding of firms’ SC capabilities regarding mitigating 
COVID-19 disruptions. Using Likert scale (1–5) 
questionnaires, an in-depth analysis of the conceptual 
understanding of SCRes addressed the gap between perceived 
and actual implementation that lacks empirical evidence [20].  
The objectives of the questionnaire were (1) to find the 
perceived important dimensions (theory) and variables 
(practice) of SC capabilities that were identified as valuable in 
tackling the COVID-19 disruptions and (2) to understand the 
actual SC capability level of the firm. The meanings of each of 
the SC capability dimensions and variables were explained 
thoroughly to the participants. 
From the results, the average score for each dimension and 
variable reflects the managers’ perceived importance regarding 
the various SCRes capabilities that theoretically could be 
deployed to tackle the business disruption caused by the 
pandemic (see Figure 2). As depicted in Figure 2, the SC 
capability dimension (a) SC response and recovery (4.25) 
scored highest on perceived importance, followed by SC 
integration (4.00), flexibility (3.71) and readiness (3.61). The 
top four SCRes capabilities (b) were RD6:  personal security 
with a COVID-19 protocol that includes policies on working 
from home, checking body temperature, and physical 
distancing (4.75); RR2: communication and collaboration with 
the government (4.50); F6: flexibility in distribution to 
customers (4.25); and IN2: internal integration between plants 
and departments (4.25). All 18 variables were given ratings of 
more than 3.00, indicating that the participants believed that the 
SC capability variables had a significant impact on their ability 
to tackle the SC disruption brought about by COVID-19. 
The ratings given to the actual SCRes capabilities differ 
significantly from the ratings for the perceived importance of 
the SCRes capabilities in tackling the disruption. Figure 3 
shows the average scores for the actual levels of the SC 
capability dimensions (a) and variables (b). The respondents 
highlighted that the SC response and recovery dimension (4.13) 
was the most important area, followed by SC readiness (3.11), 
SC integration (3.08) and flexibility (3.04). Among the 
variables, mitigating the COVID-19 disruption commonly 
relied on RD6: personal security with a COVID-19 protocol 
(4.50), RR2: communication and collaboration with the 
government (4.25), RR1: having a response team (4.00), and 
IN2: internal integration between plants and departments 
(4.00). Two variables were rated below 3.00 on average, 
including F3, multi-purpose machines (2.50), and RD2, 
readiness to anticipate currency fluctuations and cash flow 
(2.75). That is, the impossibility of changing the installed 
production machinery and the inability to anticipate currency 




TABLE III  
DIMENSIONS AND VARIABLES OF SCRES CAPABILITIES IN THE FACE OF COVID-19 DISRUPTIONS FROM THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
 
Dimensions of SCRes 
Capabilities 
Variables of SCRes Capabilities 
Supply Production Demand Average 
Decision 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4  
Proactive SCRes Capabilities 
Flexibility 
(F1) Flexibility in production1, 2, 3, 4     3 3 3 3     3.00 Feasible 
(F2) Multi-skilled workforce1, 2     3 3 3 3     3.00 Feasible 
(F3) Multi-purpose machines5     1 1 3 3     2.00 Feasible 
(F4) Contract flexibility6, 7 3 3 3 3         3.00 Feasible 
(F5) Flexibility in sourcing1 ,7 3 3 3 3         3.00 Feasible 
(F6) Flexibility in distribution1         3 3 3 3 3.00 Feasible 
SC Readiness 
COVID-19 disruption detection8, 9 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.58 Not feasible 
(RD1) Readiness to train workers in production7, 10     1 3 3 3     2.50 Feasible 
(RD2) Readiness to anticipate currency fluctuations and cash 
flow7 
3 3 3 0         2.25 Feasible 
(RD3) Forecast demand12,13         3 3 3 3 3.00 Feasible 
(RD4) Readiness to manage inventory7, 11 3 3 3 3     3 3 3 3 3.00 Feasible 
(RD5) Readiness to identify alternative transportation 
options13,14 
3 3 0 3     3 3 3 3 2.63 Feasible 
(RD6) Personal security with a COVID-19 pandemic 
protocol7 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 2.33 Feasible 
SC Integration 
(IN1) Sharing valuable and strategic information 2, 7 3 3 3 0     3 3 3 0 2.25 Feasible 
(IN2) Internal integration between plants and departments2, 7     3 3 3 3     3.00 Feasible 
(IN3) IT to manage vendors and customers 3 0 3 3     3 0 1 3 2.00 Feasible 
(IN4) Increasing existing and new collaboration with SC 
partners2, 7 
3 3 0 3     3 3 0 3 2.25 Feasible 
Reactive SCRes Capabilities 
SC Response and Recovery 
Quick response to the COVID-19 pandemic12 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.50 Not feasible 
(RR1) Response team to quickly handle the COVID-19 
pandemic7 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 Feasible 
Quick recovery12 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.67 Not feasible 
Loss absorption13 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.50 Not feasible 
Reduction of impact13,14 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.50 Not feasible 
Recovery costs13 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.75 Not feasible 
(RR2) Communication and collaboration with the 
government7,15 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 Feasible 
Note: 0 = not sure, 1 = to some extent, 3 = important; the capabilities in italics were removed for not being feasible 
 
Note: 1Swafford, Ghosh and Murthy (2006); 2Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009); 3Chowdhury and Quaddus (2017); 4Hosseini et al. (2019); 5Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015); 6Lummus, Vokurka and Duclos (2005); 
7Pettit, Croxton and Fiksel (2013); 8Burnard, Bhamra and Tsinopoulos (2018); 9Burnard and Bhamra (2011); 10Hohenstein et al. (2015); 11Alicke, Azcue and Barriball (2020); 12Sheffi and Rice (2005); 13Blackhurst, 













C. Prioritizing the Dimensions and Variables of SCRes 
Capabilities 
The prioritization of dimensions and variables was carried out 
using MCDM analysis in Microsoft Excel 2020 software 
following the protocol in Triantaphyllou [65]. Since the 
deployment of SCRes is not universal and depends on multiple 
aspects [8], this study exemplifies the SCRes capability 
prioritization process using Case 1. There are compelling 
reasons for selecting Case 1. First, the informant (SC manager) 
had relatively better experience with and understanding of the 
budgets of SCRes capabilities. Second, the firm size of Case 1, 
which was smaller and had limited resources, could yield better 
guidance for firms with limited resources. The weighted sum 
model was used to calculate the score and determine the rank of 
each SCRes capability variable. Three attributes of decision 
making (perceived importance, perceived actual, and perceived 
costs) were used to determine four alternative dimensions 
astypes of capability strategies, i.e., increasing flexibility, SC 
readiness, SC integration, and SC readiness capabilities. The 
weights of the three attributes were subjectively determined 
based on the opinions of the respondents.  
The score of each variable was calculated followed by a 
ranking of the dimensions and variables of the SCRes 
capabilities, as depicted in Figure 4. The results show that the 
SC response and recovery (0.76) and SC flexibility (0.57) 
variables were ranked as the top two priorities and would 
represent the best decision regarding the SCRes capability 
dimensions to tackle the COVID-19 disruption. In prioritizing 
the SCRes capability variables, three attribute decisions were 
also used. Figure 5 indicates the SCRes capability priority. 
Communication and collaboration with the government (0.86) 
indicates that firms should work closely with governments in 
combating COVID-19. Both firms and the government must 
invest a concerted effort, as COVID-19 remains difficult to 
control and full of uncertainty. The ability to forecast demand 
(0.72) is also important, especially when disruptions occur in 
the SC. Forecasting demand enables a strategic evaluation of 
material sourcing and a focus on the highest-value production 
line of the firm. The flexibility in distribution (0.71) is a 
valuable SCRes capability and a valuable tool to address the 
restricted movement required during COVID-19. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This research sheds some light on the SCRes capabilities that 
can help firms resist disruptions, particularly those from 
COVID-19. This research proposed a research framework that 
was developed based on the existing literature on SCRes. The 
framework was scrutinized under the COVID-19 disruption 
settings by identifying and understanding its real impact on the 
SC; hence, more appropriate SCRes capabilities are elicited for 
investigation. The SCRes capabilities in the proposed model are 
further validated with an empirical investigation, in which the 
feasibility, importance, and prioritization are highlighted. In 
other words, this research begins with the proposed theoretical 
framework, which is then operationalized into its possible 
applications. The model development and testing used data 
from the Indonesian healthcare and drinking water supply 
chain. In concluding this research, the implications for theory 
and practice will now be provided. 
 
A. Implications for Theory 
The COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented and novel. The 
disruptions to SCs have been enormous, as highlighted in this 
research. COVID-19 has changed the business landscape [66], 
[67], resulting in new norms in the SC that require firms to 
reconstitute their capabilities. The results indicate differences 
between the perceived importance and the actual strategy and 
practices involved in SCRes. These differences provide some 
theoretical contributions. First, this research provides empirical 
evidence for the applicability and relevance of all SCRes 
elements in all SCs [8], [9]. The previous literature highlighted 
the importance of SCRes during disruptions; however, limited 
research has been conducted in real case scenarios. This 
research has provided empirical evidence that is based on real 
case scenarios. The newly proposed framework provides a 
holistic SC disruption map that includes SCRes capabilities and 
provides deeper insight into the SCRes literature. 
Second, a gap between theory and practice is found for 
SCRes. For example, even though flexibility is one of the most 
popular strategies in the SCRes literature [20], this research 
provides an example of how the most popular strategy may not 
be the best strategy for different disruptions, firms and 
capabilities. Therefore, this research enriches the understanding 
of how the SCRes literature needs to be carefully generalized 
by future research and practitioners. This research has opened 
up the possibility for a more insightful discussion on SCRes, 
especially on firm capabilities. Third, this research suggests that 
the SCRes profile of a firm is highly dependent on the firm’s 
resources and capabilities [13], [28]. Furthermore, the results 
have shown that the aspects perceived as important in 
responding to the disruption may not be the best solutions for 
firms. A validation using case 1 in this research has shown that 
the SCRes capability plays an important role in creating a more 
sustainable SCRes strategy, hence suggesting that the 
discussion of SCRes needs to be in tandem with the firm’s 
capabilities. 
 
B. Implications for Practice 
This study provides practical managerial guidance with a 
framework for SCRes to mitigate the SC disruption stemming 
from the COVID-19 pandemic. First, this research sheds light 
on how firm managers use SCRes strategies to combat 
disruptions such as COVID-19. Practising managers can use 
this research as a guideline to understand the relationship 
between posited disruptions and possible capabilities in 
different SC contexts. Second, firms that have characteristics 
similar to those of the cases studied in this research should be 
aware of similar conditions and alternatives that lie within their 
firm and SC. Thus, firms should be more prepared and 
proactive when preparing for possible disruptions in the future. 
Third, this research unravels a set of applicable capabilities that 
can be beneficial in establishing a reactive SCRes strategy. 





Fig. 4. The decision-making structure and results for the priority of SCRes capability dimensions in case 1. 
 
 
Fig. 5. The decision-making structure and results from prioritizing the SCRes capability variables in case 1. 
 
when it is clear that not all capabilities are equally important 
and efficient. Some SCRes capabilities are perceived as 
important but may not be feasible, and some may seem to be 
feasible, but their effectiveness can be a hurdle that should be 
taken into account. In short, each trait needs to be considered in 
the selection of the SCRes capabilities to be deployed during a 
disruption. Through a detailed discussion and examination of 
the COVID-19 disruption and the provided firm capabilities, 
this research offers important information to policy makers and 
governments to help firms survive global disruptions such as 
COVID-19. 
C. Limitations and Future Research Agenda 
The study does have limitations. The four dimensions and 
accompanying sets of variables of SC capabilities within the 
SCRes framework for the COVID-19 pandemic are 
interrelated. However, these interrelations have yet to be 
explored. Moreover, guidelines on how to operationalize SC 
capabilities are needed. Research on the interrelations among 
the dimensions and variables would provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of SC capabilities. The 
uncertainties and complexities of different countries (e.g., 
developed and developing countries) and industries (e.g., 
automotive, cement, oil and gas, food processing) are likely to 
differ greatly from those of the drinking water and 
pharmaceutical industries, and firm sizes (e.g., multi-national 
corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises) will also 
have an effect. Future research is needed to strengthen the 
validation of the proposed framework. Yin (2009) recommends 
replication and extension to different types of industries. 
Therefore, more cases are needed to add value to the proposed 
SCRes framework. 
APPENDIX 












SAMPLE QUESTIONS FROM THE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Questions related to the supply-side 
1. Availability of raw materials: What are the main raw materials in your company? From which country is the raw 
material sourced? Please explain the availability of your raw materials as your country is affected by the COVID-
19 pandemic. 
2. Availability of spare parts: Where is the source of spare parts for your company? Please explain the availability 
of spare parts. 
3. Fluctuation of raw material price: Is the price of your raw materials increasing or decreasing? Please explain 
the reasons that prices are decreasing or increasing, such as raw material prices, currency fluctuations, 
transportation costs, and others. 
4. Transportation: Please explain the transportation of your main raw materials. 
Production-side 
1. Production fluctuations: Please explain your finished products and fluctuations in the amount of production. 
2. The fluctuation of production hours and workers: Please explain fluctuations in the number of hours of your 
production and the number of workers as your country is affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
3. Employee productivity: Please explain the productivity of your workers in production as your country is affected 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
4. COVID-19 protocol in production: Did your company implement protocols for the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
production floor, as recommended by WHO and your government? Please explain the protocols and procedures 
implemented for the COVID-19 pandemic on your production floor, such as wearing masks, physical distancing, 
etc. 
Demand-side 
1. Volatility of demand: Please explain the volatility of customer demand for your finished products 
2. Prices of finished products: Is the price of your finished products increasing or decreasing? Please explain the 
reasons that the price of your finished product decreased or increased, such as production costs, delivery costs, 
and others 
3. Stock of finished products in the warehouse: Is your stock of finished products (including buffer stock) 
increasing or decreasing? Please explain why your stock of finished products is decreasing or increasing 
4. The number of delivery trips (distribution): Please explain the number of delivery trips to your customers and 
the condition of your distribution system as your country is affected by the COVID-19 pandemic 
5. Productivity of sales and distribution employees: Please explain the productivity of your employees in sales 
and distribution as your country is affected by the COVID-19 pandemic 
6. COVID-19 protocol in sales and distribution: Has your company implemented protocols for the COVID-19 
pandemic in your distribution channel? Please explain the protocol and procedure for the COVID-19 pandemic in 
your distribution channel for sales employees and drivers, such as working from home, wearing masks, physical 
distancing, and others 
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